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COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
531 U.S. 159 (2001) (holding the Army Corp of Engineers' ("Corps")
regulation defining "navigable waters" to include intrastate waters, as
clarified and applied to the petitioners' landfill site, pursuant to the
Migratory Bird Rule, exceeded the authority granted to the Corps
under section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act).
The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County ("SWANCC"), a
consortium of twenty-three suburban Chicago municipalities, selected
for their baled nonhazardous waste disposal an abandoned sand and
gravel pit mining site. The site included excavation trenches that had
evolved into scattered permanent and seasonal ponds. Since the
project would involve filling these ponds, SWANCC contacted the
United States Corps of Engineers ("Corps") to determine if section
404(a) of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") required it to obtain a federal
landfill permit.
Section 404(a) authorizes the Corps to regulate the discharge of
fill into "navigable waters," which the statute defines as "the waters of
the United States, including the territorial seas."
The Corps
promulgated 33 C.F.R. section 328.3(a)(3) ("the regulation"), which
defined "navigable waters" to include intrastate waters, the use or
destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce.
Applying the regulation, the Corps initially concluded that it had no
jurisdiction over the site.
However, after the Illinois Nature Preserves Commission informed
the Corps of reported observations of migratory bird species at the site,
the Corps reconsidered and ultimately asserted jurisdiction over the
balefill site under the Migratory Bird Rule. In relevant part, the
Migratory Bird Rule states that section 404(a) extends to intrastate
waters "which are or could be used by migratory birds that cross state
lines." In November 1987, the Corps formally determined that the
seasonally ponded, abandoned gravel mining depressions located on
the SWANCC project site, while not wetlands, did qualify as "waters of
the United States" under the CWA because: (1) the proposed area was
an abandoned mining site; (2) the water areas and spoil piles had
developed a natural character; and (3) migratory birds which cross
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state lines used the water areas as habitat.
Although SWANCC secured the required water quality certification
from the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, the Corps refused
to issue a section 404(a) permit. The Corps denied the permit on
three grounds. First, the Corps found SWANCC had failed to establish
that its proposal was the least environmentally damaging, most
practicable alternative for disposal of nonhazardous waste. Second,
SWANCC's failure to set aside sufficient funds to remediate leaks
posed an unacceptable threat to the public's drinking water supply.
Finally, the Corps found that the impact of the project upon areasensitive species was unmitigatable since a landfill surface could not be
redeveloped into a forested habitat.
SWANCC filed suit under the Administrative Procedure Act in the
Northern District of Illinois challenging both the Corps' jurisdiction
over the site and the merits of its denial of the section 404(a) permit.
The district court granted summary judgment to the federal
respondents on the jurisdictional issue, and SWANCC abandoned its
challenge to the Corps' permit decision. On appeal to the Seventh
Circuit, SWANCC renewed its attack on the Corps' use of the
Migratory Bird Rule to assert jurisdiction over the site. The appellate
court held that under the "cumulative impact doctrine," Congress had
the authority to regulate such waters. The court reasoned that the
cumulative effect on interstate commerce of the destruction of
migratory bird habitat was substantial because millions of Americans
annually spend over a billion dollars to hunt and observe migratory
birds. Furthermore, the appellate court held the CWA reached as
many waters as the Commerce Clause allows, and thus, the Migratory
Bird Rule was a reasonable interpretation of the CWA. SWANCC
appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Court granted
certiorari and reversed.
The Supreme Court found the Corps had interpreted section
404(a) to cover the abandoned gravel pit at issue because migratory
birds use it as habitat. The Court concluded the CWA does not fairly
support the Migratory Bird Rule in this case. The Court explained
that it previously held in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.
that the Corps had section 404(a) jurisdiction over wetlands that
actually abutted a navigable waterway. Unlike the wetlands in Riverside,
the Court found the ponds on the SWANCC site were not adjacent to
an open waterway. Thus, the Court found Riverside inapplicable.
Next, the Court turned to the text and legislative history of the
CWA. The Court found the Corps' original interpretation of the CWA
inconsistent with its current one. Specifically, the Court noted that the
Corps' 1974 regulations defined section 404(a)'s "navigable waters" to
mean those waters of the United States, which are subject to the ebb
and flow of the tide, and have been, presently are, or may in the future
be susceptible to use for interstate or foreign commerce. However, the
Corps argued that three years later, Congress approved an expanded
definition of "navigable waters." The Corps asserted that, in July 1977,
it adopted a regulation that defined waters of the United States to
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include isolated, intrastate, nonnavigable waters that are not part of a
tributary system to interstate waters or to navigable waters of the
United States, the degradation or destruction of which could affect
interstate commerce. The Corps contended that Congress's failure to
pass a proposed house bill overturning the Corps' 1977 legislation,
which extended its jurisdiction in CWA section 404(g) to waters "other
congressional
than traditional navigable waters," indicated
acquiescence to the Corps' interpretation of the CWA.
The Court
The Court found this argument unpersuasive.
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actions or inactions of the 1977 Congress and the intent of the
Congress in passing section 404(a) too attenuated. Accordingly, the
Court concluded the Corps failed to make the necessary showing that
the failure of the 1977 house bill demonstrated Congress's
acquiescence to the Corps' 1977 regulation or the Migratory Bird
Rule.
The Court also found section 40 4 (g) unenlightening. After
reviewing section 40 4 (g)'s language, the Court stated the text gave no
indication of what the "other than traditional waters" might be. Thus,
the Court concluded that section 404(g) failed to conclusively
determine the construction a court should place on the term "waters"
defined elsewhere in the CWA.
Finally, the Corps contended the Court should give deference to
the Migratory Bird Rule, since Congress did not address the precise
scope of section 404(a) with regard to nonnavigable, isolated,
intrastate waters. The Court explained that where an otherwise
acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional
problems, the Court would construe the statue to avoid such problems,
unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.
The Court reasoned that allowing the Corps to extend federal
jurisdiction over ponds falling within the Migratory Bird Rule would
seriously impinge the states' traditional and primary power over land
and water use. Finding no express congressional intent for section
404(a) to reach abandoned sand and gravel pits, the Court declined to
extend administrative deference.
The Court reversed and held the CWA did not permit the Corps to
extend its section 404(a) jurisdiction over "navigable waters" to
isolated ponds, some only seasonal, wholly located within two Illinois
counties, because they serve as habitat for migratory birds.
Four justices dissented from the majority opinion. The dissenting
opinion stated that power to regulate commerce among the several
states includes the power to preserve natural resources that generate
such commerce. The dissent found migratory birds, and the waters on
which they rely, were such resources. Furthermore, the dissent
explained that the protection of migratory birds was a well-established
federal responsibility. Therefore, the dissent found no merit in
SWANCC's constitutional argument and would have affirmed the
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judgment of the court of appeals.
Kris A. Zumalt

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
FIRST CIRCUIT
Baker v. Coxe, 230 F.3d 470 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding substantive due
process and equal protection rights were not violated when neither a
legitimate government purpose in delaying the issuance of a land use
permit existed, nor an exercise of free speech violation existed, when
the delay was not the result of retaliation).
In May 1991, Plaintiffs, John and Susan Baker ("Bakers"), applied
for a permit to build a pier on land they owned and operated as a tree
farm on Clark's Island in Plymouth Harbor, Massachusetts. The pier
would enable equipment unloading in furtherance of the tree farm
operation. Clark's Island served as a major nesting area, or heronry,
for several varieties of sea birds. The Army Corps of Engineers was in
the process of preparing to issue the permit when Jay Copeland, an
environmental researcher for Natural Heritage, objected.
Natural Heritage felt the proximity of the nesting area to the
Bakers' tree farm would disrupt the heronry, thus causing the birds to
abandon their nests. After the issuance of a notice-and-comment
period, Natural Heritage contacted an ornithologist, Dr. Katharine
Parsons, who was familiar with the island. Parsons informed Copeland
of her concerns about the land use and of her suspicions that the land
was merely a "tax dodge." Parsons also told Copeland of Mr. Baker's
opposition to 1989 legislation that, if enacted, would have classified
Clark's Island as an Area of Critical Environmental Concern
("ACEC"), subjecting it to use restrictions. Copeland and others'
subsequent visit to the island revealed the heronry was essentially
destroyed.
After contact with other agencies and some investigation into the
Bakers' operation, Natural Heritage filed a formal opposition to the
permit application, asserting the pier construction would significantly
contribute to the destruction of a major natural resource. Further,
Natural Heritage successfully collected ten citizens' signatures to
initiate environmental review under the Massachusetts Environmental
Policy Act. After Natural Heritage filed the required forms, the
Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs ("EOEA")
issued a decision requiring the Bakers to file an Environmental Impact
Report ("EIR"). After litigation concerning the scope of the EIR, the
Army Corps of Engineers issued the permit to the Bakers in 1997, and
the Bakers built the pier.

